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 A THIRD WORLD
 STRATEGY
 by Thomas Ehrlich and Catherine Gwin
 On October 22 and October 23, 1981, Presi-
 dent Reagan and the leaders of 22 major devel-
 oped and developing nations will meet in
 Canctin, Mexico. Proposed initially by the
 Brandt Commission, this North-South summit
 meeting offers America's new president a
 chance to exercise constructive leadership in
 shaping cooperative relations on a range of is-
 sues of major importance to the United States
 as well as the rest of the world. To do so, the
 Reagan administration must first design its
 own U.S. program of economic cooperation
 with Third World nations that responds to
 pressing international development problems
 and has the support of the American people.
 This program is needed not as an agenda for
 summit discussions, but as the framework for
 U.S. leadership in those discussions.
 So far, the Reagan administration has of-
 fered little positive along these lines. Instead, in
 its first months in office, the administration has
 made plain that it regards U.S. relations with
 developing countries as important primarily to
 check the spread of Soviet influence. The ad-
 ministration, therefore, has asked Congress to
 increase security assistance while reducing
 development assistance. It is moving, as Secre-
 tary of State Alexander Haig, Jr. testified, "to-
 ward a greater emphasis on bilateral rather than
 multilateral assistance." It will give special at-
 tention to those regimes that most loudly pro-
 claim their pro-American allegiance, regardless
 of their commitment to equitable development
 in their own countries. This approach is de-
 signed to secure U.S. interests by concen-
 trating on short-term political gains viewed
 THOMAS EHRLICH, director of the International De-
 velopment Cooperation Agency (IDCA), 1979-1981, is
 provost and professor of law at the University of Pennsyl-
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 mainly through an East-West prism.
 This is a wrong-headed strategy. It will lead
 to a reactive foreign policy in which American
 adversaries-not clear calculations of U.S.
 interests in the Third World-determine U.S.
 priorities. It underestimates the fierce determi-
 nation of developing nations to be independ-
 ent. Moreover, the short-term political ap-
 proach risks tying the United States to regimes
 whose people may not support them. When
 those regimes fall, as many will, ties with the
 United States will collapse with them.
 A less reactive and more positive approach
 would be consonant with Reagan's determina-
 tion to reassert American leadership in world
 affairs. This alternative approach should offer
 an affirmative program of economic cooper-
 ation involving sustained support for economic
 development in Third World countries. The
 program should be based on long-term U.S.
 interests in the Third World: economic, politi-
 cal, strategic, and humanitarian. Pursuit of
 these interests is fundamental to U.S. national
 security, not just in its narrow, barbed-wire
 sense, but in its broadest dimensions.
 Economic stakes. The Third World is a
 fast-growing market for U.S. exports. In 1979
 $63 billion-35 per cent of total U.S. ex-
 ports-went to developing countries. This
 amount includes $45 billion in manufactured
 products-- more than 39 per cent of total U.S. manufactured exports. In 1979 the United
 States sold to developing countries 45 per cent
 of its cotton exports, 50 per cent of its wheat
 exports, and 74 per cent of its rice exports.
 To a growing extent, the United States relies
 on developing countries for vital materials. For
 example, the United States imports 96 per cent
 of its cobalt, 87 per cent of its tin, 86 per cent
 of its bauxite used for aluminum, and all its
 natural rubber supplies from developing coun-
 tries. Most important, 41 per cent of the petro-
 leum Americans use comes from developing
 countries, and about half that amount from
 nations outsidethe Middle past. At the end of
 1979, U.S. firms had invested close to $48 bil-
 lion in developing countries, nearly one quarter
 of total U.S. foreign direct investment.
 Political and strategic interests. The
 U.S. need to obtain or maintain base, transit,
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 and overflight rights varies significantly from
 country to country and region to region. Those
 rights are enormously important to U.S.
 security in much of the Third World, par-
 ticularly in the Middle East. The United States
 also has a stake in controlling international ter-
 rorism and nuclear proliferation. Only the co-
 operation of all countries, including those of
 the Third World, can resolve these problems.
 More fundamental, the United States seeks a
 world at peace in which each nation honors the
 national sovereignty of other countries and re-
 spects the human rights of its own citizens.
 Turmoil in Third World countries-likely to
 increase as nations try to adjust to the high cost
 of energy and slowed growth in the
 West-invites outside interference and in-
 creases chances of international armed conflict
 and pressures for direct U.S. involvement.
 Humanitarian concerns. America's
 moral values are tested by its response to acute
 hunger and deprivation. Assisting Third
 World efforts to eliminate extreme poverty
 demonstrates U.S. leadership in the world.
 Against this background of U.S. national
 interests, the diversity of the Third World pre-
 sents a complex set of challenges for American
 policy makers. The economic challenges posed
 by newly industrial nations such as Brazil and
 South Korea differ from those presented by the
 oil-rich, and both sets of problems are distinct
 from those raised by strategically important
 nations such as Turkey and Egypt. Moreover,
 America's interests in all three groups of coun-
 tries are distinct from U.S. interests in poor
 and politically volatile Third World nations.
 Among the last grouping, the United States has
 special interests - based on history as well as
 geography-in Central America and the
 Caribbean.
 Supporting Third World Development
 American domestic politics and world events
 dictate that specific foreign policy priorities
 shift from time to time and from administration
 to administration. But only by identifying
 broad foreign policy objectives that will best
 further U.S. interests can policy makers set
 sensible priorities. The analysis of U.S. inter-
 ests outlined above requires that a central ob-
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 jective of U.S. policy toward the Third World
 be to encourage Third World economic
 growth, openness to international trade and in-
 vestment, and an orientation toward coopera-
 tion with the United States on global problems
 of common concern. This objective ought to
 shape the general foreign policy of any admin-
 istration within which specific country priori-
 ties are set. In turn, achieving this objective
 demands consistent and coherent long-term
 U.S. support for Third World development:
 improving the standard of living through in-
 creased production of goods and services and
 equitable distribution of the benefits.
 Development is the underlying requirement
 for the continued expansion of U.S. exports
 and investment in the Third World and offers
 a primary possibility for increasing signifi-
 cantly the world's supply of energy and food. If
 an affirmative U.S. development policy is
 stifled by East-West myopia, governments that
 allow U.S. bases or accept U.S. military aid
 risk being branded as American stooges. Only
 if developing countries perceive an American
 willingness to cooperate on the issue of their
 primary concern-their development--can the
 United States expect cooperation on its politi-
 cal, security, and economic concerns. Hunger,
 rapid population growth, extreme environ-
 mental degradation, and rising debts have
 reached crisis proportions in many Third
 World countries. The United States alone can-
 not solve these problems. But the quality and
 strength of U.S. leadership will have a major
 bearing on the pace and direction of Third
 World development.
 What are the needs of developing nations to
 which the United States should respond as a
 means of furthering American leadership and
 interests? At his confirmation hearings, Haig
 said: "If one thing has become abundantly clear
 in the last decade or so, it is that the common-
 alty of condition, purpose-and, by extension,
 U.S. foreign policy-implied by the term
 'Third World' is a myth and a dangerous one
 at that." It is true that the economic prob-
 lems facing Third World countries vary
 enormously-hardly surprising when in 1980
 per capita gross national product ranged from
 $90 in Bangladesh to $1,510 in Brazil.
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 The risks are no less real, however, in ignor-
 ing the commonalties and, even more impor-
 tant, the deep sense of unity among those coun-
 tries, which results from their common need to
 develop economically. The coincidence of dra-
 matic oil price rises, sharp increases in the cost
 of imported manufactured goods, expanded
 interest payments on rapidly accumulating
 debts, and slower growth in exports to the in-
 dustrial economies have exacerbated their
 shared problems. The net oil bill of developing
 countries exceeded $60 billion in 1980 and is
 expected to double by 1990. Their combined
 current account deficit was $80 billion in 1980
 and is predicted to exceed $95 billion in 1981.
 Some developing nations have financed their
 deficits through exceptionally large increases in
 borrowing. As a result, the public and publicly
 guaranteed external debt of 92 non-oil-pro-
 ducing developing countries rose from $72 bil-
 lion in 1973 to $225 billion in 1979.
 Economic cooperation with the
 Third World is fundamental to
 U.S. national security . . in its
 broadest dimensions.
 In the face of these problems, Third World
 nations at every level of development must ad-
 just their economies. In the 1960s and 1970s,
 many developing countries sought short-term
 balance of payments financing in difficult
 years. Now they need to adjust to major struc-
 tural changes in the global economy. These
 adjustments must be substantial in order to sus-
 tain even moderate rates of growth without
 incurring serious payments imbalances or un-
 manageable external debts. Although needs
 will vary from country to country, greater self-
 sufficiency in energy and food, sensible import
 substitution, and promotion of exports have
 become essential. The process of redirecting
 investment, consumption, and trade will be
 long and politically difficult. If developing
 countries are to succeed, they must have con-
 tinued access to the markets of the industrial
 nations, extended adjustment financing, and,
 most important, increased investment in food
 and energy sectors.
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 Major increases in food and agriculture pro-
 duction are required, particularly in South
 Asia and sub-Saharan Africa, to stem growing
 dependence on food imports and to help raise
 incomes of the poor. With assistance, substan-
 tial progress is achievable. Over the next five
 years, countries such as Cameroon, Kenya,
 Nicaragua, Pakistan, Zambia, and Zimbabwe
 should be able to become self-sufficient in
 grains. Others, such as Bangladesh, where
 complete self-sufficiency by mid-decade is less
 likely, can nevertheless substantially reduce
 their dependence on imports.
 Increased food production in the Third
 World directly benefits the United States.
 America, which provides 40 per cent of the
 world's wheat exports, is by far the largest
 grain exporter. But the United States cannot
 continue to meet the bulk of growing world
 food demands without itself experiencing sharp
 increases in the costs of food as well as disrup-
 tive price fluctuations as an ever larger share of
 U.S. farm output is traded internationally.
 Similarly, the development of new Third
 World energy resources and better manage-
 ment of existing ones could expand oil supplies
 available from countries not belonging to the
 Organization of Petroleum Exporting Coun-
 tries (OPEC) and stem the increase of costly oil
 imports by developing countries. Such expan-
 sion would slow the rise in the costs of import-
 ing oil for all nations, including the United
 States. Oil and gas production in oil-importing
 Third World countries could increase from the
 current 2.6 million barrels a day (MMB/D) to 5.9
 MMB/D or more by 1990, according to the
 World Bank (International Bank for Recon-
 struction and Development). The necessary in-
 vestments are economic at current prices. An
 accelerated exploration program begun in the
 next few years would lead to even greater pro-
 duction in the 1990s. Coal, now used largely in
 India and China, could substitute for about 2.1
 MMB/D by 1990; American coal could be used
 and thereby increase U.S. exports. Moreover,
 improved energy efficiency could save as much
 as 2.3 MMB/D. There are also sound prospects
 for expanded application of renewable energy
 technologies of many kinds, especially in rural
 areas. The potential for increased hydropower
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 is great; only 10 per cent of feasible potential
 has been exploited. Systematic reforestation
 can reverse the too rapid decline in the availa-
 bility of wood used for fuel.
 Depending on the speed at which such ef-
 forts take place, by 1990 demand for imported
 oil by developing countries could grow by 3
 MMB/D or fall by as much as~2.5 MMB/D. This
 swing of 5.5 million barrels daily will have a
 significant bearing on world energy security.
 Much smaller swings in the volatile spot market
 have led to explosive increases in the general
 price level for oil. The size of the developing
 countries' oil bills will also affect their abilities
 to manage their sharply increased international
 debt, $60 billion of which is owed to U.S.
 banks.
 Limiting population growth is a critical com-
 panion issue because of the long-term pressures
 of high birth rates on the world's resources,
 particularly food and energy. Only one-third
 of the couples in developing countries, exclud-
 ing China, have reasonable access to family
 planning services. This figure can be doubled
 over the next decade if donor countries, which
 now allocate only 2 per cent of their total aid for
 population programs, and developing countries
 alike make the effort. Resources devoted
 annually to population control-now only
 $1 billion, including $450 million in donor
 assistance-would have to double by 1985. If
 family planning practice then doubled by 1990,
 the developing countries would have only 3.3
 billion people by the year 2000 instead of 3.8
 billion. By 2020, the Third World population
 would reach 4.1 billion instead of 5.1 billion.
 The United States can make important con-
 tributions to the solution of these and other key
 development problems, but only through coor-
 dination of policies, programs, and resource
 transfers. For middle-income countries, much
 can be done through trade and investment poli-
 cies without large expenditures of public
 funds. Scientific-technological cooperation is a
 key area in which Third World development
 can be promoted by the United States without
 significant costs. But for poorer nations, in-
 creased development assistance on concessional
 terms is also needed. U.S. leadership in dealing
 with Third World nations cannot be achieved
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 without reversing the downward trend of aid
 over the past decade. U.S. development assis-
 tance in real terms dropped from $5.5 billion in
 1970 to approximately $5.1 billion in 1980.
 The United States now ranks 15 out of 17
 among developed countries in terms of official
 development assistance as a per cent of gross
 national product (GNP).
 A program is needed that encourages devel-
 oping countries to commit themselves to equi-
 table and sustainable growth, increased open-
 ness to international trade and investment, and
 cooperation on the foreign policy issues of im-
 portance to the United States. Five key areas
 need particular attention: private investment,
 trade, scientific cooperation, international
 financial support, and levels of U.S. aid.
 Promoting Private Investment
 The U.S. government should actively en-
 courage greater American private sector in-
 volvement in Third World development. New
 measures are needed to expand U.S.? private
 investment in developing countries and to en-
 hance activities by American businesses that
 increase the development benefits of their
 investments.
 Much of the controversy surrounding
 foreign investment in developing countries had
 subsided by the end of the 1970s. Many devel-
 oping countries indicate they want more, not
 less, U.S. investment. These countries have
 become increasingly sophisticated in designing
 policies to channel multinational corporate re-
 sources into areas where they are most wanted
 and in obtaining the most out of what multi-
 national corporations have to offer. Similarly,
 American corporations have discovered new
 arrangements for doing business in developing
 countries consistent with the national aspira-
 tions of those countries. But the full potential
 of U.S. private sector involvement in promot-
 ing development to the benefit of investors,
 host, and home country is far from achieved. In
 the past decade, U.S. investment in developing
 countries, excluding the petroleum sector,
 grew at an annual rate of 29 per cent compared
 with a rate of only 16 per cent in developed
 countries. But developing countries still ac-
 count for only one quarter of total U.S. foreign
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 direct investment, and 10 developing countries
 attracted 70 per cent of the share.
 U.S. private investment in Third World pe-
 troleum, mining, and smelting-areas of vital
 interest to the United States-lagged behind
 such investment in developed countries in the
 1970s. Despite the resource potential of the
 developing world, U.S. investment in develop-
 ing country petroleum activities increased only
 $587 million from 1970 to 1980; in developed
 countries it increased $20 billion. In Third
 World mining and smelting, U.S. investment
 grew by $300 million; in developed countries'
 operations it grew by nearly $1.5 billion.
 By almost any measure, the Third World
 remains underexplored and its resources un-
 derdeveloped. Although 40 per cent of the
 world's prospective oil-bearing terrain is in
 non-OPEC developing countries, their share of
 proven oil reserves in 1980 was only 11.5 per
 cent of the world total. As of January 1978, the
 density of drilling in the United States was
 more than 100 times as great per square mile of
 potential oil-bearing terrain as in the non-OPEC
 developing countries, and nearly 800 times as
 great as in Africa. In mining, a recent survey of
 U.S. and Canadian mining companies indi-
 cates that 80 per cent of their exploration ex-
 penditures have been in developed countries,
 despite economically accessible ore in the de-
 veloping world.
 A number of existing U.S. programs affect
 U.S. business in Third World countries, but
 few of those programs have a strong develop-
 ment focus. The Export-Import Bank provides
 export financing, credit guarantees, and insur-
 ance, but not with a view to promoting devel-
 opment. Bank activities in 1980 totaled $4.4
 billion in loans, about half of which went to
 developing countries, and $8 billion in guar-
 antees and insurance.
 The Overseas Private Investment Corpora-
 tion (OPIC) primarily provides political risk in-
 surance, loans, and loan guarantees to U.S.
 investors. It has put special emphasis on
 energy-related investments in recent years, but
 it still has an ambiguous commitment to devel-
 opment as an objective. In 1980 OPIC insured
 94 projects and made commitments to finance
 18 projects in 39 countries. Its insurance cover-
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 age totaled $1. 1 billion; its loan and guar-
 anty commitments amounted to $184 million.
 The new Trade and Development Program
 (TDP) funds project identification efforts, feasi-
 bility studies, and reimbursable technical as-
 sistance. The focus of this program is on en-
 couraging U.S. exports and investment abroad
 as well as on supporting development. In 1981
 TDP was involved in 58 projects in 26 coun-
 tries. Its proposed 1982 budget is $7 million.
 Finally, through the housing guarantee pro-
 gram of the Agency for International Develop-
 ment (AID), U.S. private lenders provide
 long-term loans-$174 million in 1980-for
 low-cost housing in developing countries. Like
 TDP, this program remains small.
 Expansion of these bilateral investment-
 promotion programs could occur at little cost in
 terms of budgetary outlays, for they are essen-
 tially self-sustaining over time. The Carter ad-
 ministration was reluctant, however, to sup-
 port expansion, in part because of the difficulty
 of proving that a company would not have
 made a particular investment without a govern-
 ment guarantee. In addition, the administra-
 tion did not want to risk heightened hostility
 to private foreign investment in some devel-
 oping countries. In a speech explaining the
 Carter administration's approach, Richard N.
 Cooper, under secretary of state for economic
 affairs, stated that the United States "should
 maintain policies that do not bias the corporate
 decision-making process between foreign and
 domestic investment one way or another."
 More assertive efforts to promote both
 development and private U.S. investments
 would affirm U.S. support for greater private
 sector involvement in the development of inter-
 ested Third World countries. The support
 would not bias corporate decision making.
 Rather, it would help correct the current condi-
 tions that make it difficult for those countries
 to attract private investment. In a campaign
 speech in October 1980, Reagan specifically
 recognized the importance of that investment,
 particularly in Africa.
 To achieve this aim, an active informational
 effort should be launched to identify oppor-
 tunities that would have a high development
 impact and to help host countries interest U.S.
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 private investors. For example, technical assis-
 tance in designing national investment policies
 could help attract investment and direct it for
 host-country needs.
 The U.S. government should establish a
 business advisory council to exchange views
 with officials on the scope and direction of
 U.S. development policies and to consider in-
 novative ways of promoting greater American
 private sector participation in development.
 The U.S. bilateral economic assistance pro-
 gram in developing countries should also help
 design and fund activities that involve both
 local and U.S. businesses, e.g., training and
 research programs. While strengthening its as-
 sistance programs, the United States should
 signal its intention to negotiate, for the first
 time, bilateral investment treaties with inter-
 ested developing countries. The purpose of
 these treaties would be to improve the invest-
 ment climate by providing a floor of legal rights
 for foreign investors. The primary U.S. objec-
 tive of the treaties would not be to promote
 development; nonetheless, an improvement in
 the investment climate combined with invest-
 ment assistance for interested developing coun-
 tries could contribute substantially to develop-
 ment. Moreover, the United States should con-
 tinue to review its tax laws and follow closely
 recent reforms in those laws in order to enact,
 if necessary, further reforms that can encour-
 age foreign investment.
 Expanding Trade
 The United States should also take affirma-
 tive actions to strengthen trade ties with devel-
 oping countries.1 Over the past decade, de-
 veloping countries as a group have become a
 fast-growing market for U.S. exports, far out-
 pacing developed countries, and developing
 countries have made impressive gains in the
 growth of their exports to the United States.
 From 1970 to 1979, their exports of non-
 petroleum products to the United States
 jumped from $8.5 billion to $42 billion, an
 average annual rate of growth of 19.5 per cent.
 Manufactured exports alone from developing
 'This section draws heavily on Henry Berghoef, "Recent
 Developments in U.S. Trade Policy Affecting Developing
 Countries" (1981).
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 countries increased from $3.5 billion to $26.4
 billion. Barriers to developing country exports
 have been reduced, most recently through im-
 plementation of the U.S. Generalized System
 of Preferences (GSP), which allows many
 manufactured and agricultural products from
 developing countries to enter the U.S. market
 duty free, and as a result of agreements reached
 in the recently concluded Tokyo Round of
 Multilateral Trade Negotiations.
 Yet substantial trade barriers remain.
 Though GSP has improved the developing
 countries' access to U.S. markets, the exclusion
 of a number of exports important to eligible
 countries has seriously limited its liberalizing
 effect. Some products, including footwear, tex-
 tiles, and apparel, are legally excluded from
 GSP. Others are barred if the president deter-
 mines that they are import sensitive. The effect
 of GSP is also limited by competitive need
 criteria, which render a specific product from a
 country ineligible for GSP treatment if in any
 year the country's exports exceed $25 million
 (in 1974 dollars) or if the country accounts for
 more than 50 per cent of U.S. imports of the
 product.
 Agreements made in the Tokyo negotiations
 provide some expanded trade opportunities for
 developing countries, but the Third World is
 resentful about things not done. As a result of
 the Tokyo round, the major industrialized
 countries will reduce their tariffs by an average
 of 25 per cent on a range of items exported by
 developing nations. New codes on subsidies,
 government procurement, standards, import
 licensing, and customs valuation will provide a
 more open and stable trading environment for
 all nations. Furthermore, the Tokyo round
 establishes a permanent legal basis for special,
 more favorable treatment of developing coun-
 tries. The average tariff cuts affecting those
 countries, however, were less than those affect-
 ing products of industrial countries. In the case
 of the United States, the average tariff on
 developing countries' dutiable industrial prod-
 ucts is almost twice as high as the average tariff
 on products from the European Community
 and Japan, and more than three times as high as
 on those from Canada.
 This gap is largely because of the greater
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 percentage of industrial imports from develop-
 ing countries that were excluded from any
 tariff cuts in the Tokyo round, the extraordi-
 narily high tariffs that the United States will
 continue to maintain on textiles and apparel,
 and the relatively high duties remaining in a
 few other industrial sectors in which develop-
 ing countries predominate. Moreover, agricul-
 tural products from developing countries that
 compete with U.S. products carry relatively
 high duties -exceeding, on average, the duties
 applied to agricultural imports from industrial
 countries. Attention to these products in the
 Tokyo round was minimal.
 The Third World is resentful
 about things not done ... [in] the
 Tokyo round.
 In the area of textiles and apparel, the devel-
 oping countries' single largest manufactured
 export, the trend has been to toughen import
 restrictions in recent years. Almost all of the
 trade in these items with Third World coun-
 tries is governed by the multifiber arrangement
 (MFA). Under the MFA, the United States cur-
 rently maintains restrictive bilateral agree-
 ments with 23 textile and apparel suppliers, all
 of them developing countries except Japan.
 Four of these agreements were entered into
 since the beginning of 1978. Virtually all others
 have been renegotiated over the past three
 years to restrict imports even further. When
 multilateral textile arrangements were first
 negotiated in the early 1960s, they were to pro-
 vide for orderly growth in world textile and
 apparel trade. But with U.S. industry and
 labor pressuring for even more restrictive
 agreements, the government has done little to
 insure that the domestic industry will make real
 adjustments.
 In the context of continued slow growth in
 the United States and in other industrial coun-
 tries, prospects do not appear good for any new
 U.S. trade initiatives, unless the executive
 branch provides a major push. A program for
 economic cooperation should confront this
 problem.
 The United States should take the lead in
 seeking quick agreement on a global trade
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 pledge that would commit both developed and
 developing countries, in accordance with their
 levels of development, to restrain protectionist
 pressures. Furthermore, the United States
 should intensify efforts to achieve an agree-
 ment on a safeguards code aimed at strengthen-
 ing international discipline over import restric-
 tions. It should press to insure that the codes
 negotiated in Tokyo are effectively imple-
 mented and that the new dispute settlement
 and surveillance mechanisms function effec-
 tively. Inasmuch as various provisions of the
 new codes involve considerable ambiguity, the
 United States should urge interpretations that
 favor developing countries whenever possible.
 In addition, the executive branch should
 request new authority from Congress to enable
 the executive branch to engage in bilateral tariff
 negotiations with individual developing coun-
 tries after 1981, when the current limited au-
 thority expires. These talks will have to be real
 negotiations, with concessions made by both
 sides, if progress is to be made in further reduc-
 ing U.S. trade barriers to developing country
 exports. Most products on which the United
 States maintains high tariffs are sensitive ones
 in labor-intensive and unionized industries.
 Currently, the bulk of U.S. imports of these
 products comes from the more advanced devel-
 oping countries. Many of these countries them-
 selves maintain high barriers to trade that now
 can be eliminated without unduly compromis-
 ing their ability to manage their own econo-
 mies. Indeed, some of these countries, such as
 South Korea, are moving toward more open
 trade policies as they reach the limits of import
 substitution and see the benefits of increased
 domestic competition and an open interna-
 tional trading system.
 Finally, the United States should commit it-
 self to renewal of both its GSP, which expires in
 1985, and the MFA, which is currently under
 renegotiation. The United States should also
 expand the product coverage of its GSP and lift
 the competitive need ceiling on exports from
 the poorest countries while gradually phasing
 out some of the most advanced developing
 countries from the list of GSP-eligible coun-
 tries. In the negotiations on a renewal of the
 MFA, the United States should recommit itself
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 to the trade liberalizing spirit of the original
 MFA and press other industrial countries to do
 the same. In that context, the United States
 should accept more liberal provisions for low-
 income suppliers.
 Two premises underlie this set of trade rec-
 ommendations. The United States should
 commit itself to further trade liberalization as
 part and parcel of renewed growth, and it
 should demand in return that as Third World
 countries develop, their own commitment to an
 open trading system will also grow.
 Science and Technology
 The United States should increase its efforts
 to provide scientific and technological assis-
 tance to the Third World countries. Science
 and technology will make significant contribu-
 tions to future productivity gains and growth in
 the United States; they can and should do the
 same in the Third World. Cooperation in this
 area could, in particular, enhance U.S. rela-
 tions with those more advanced developing
 countries, such as Brazil, that no longer need
 bilateral concessional assistance but are impor-
 tant to the United States for economic or strate-
 gic reasons.
 Long-term, high-level academic and techni-
 cal training programs in U.S. institutions are
 among the most effective means the United
 States has to influence future foreign leaders
 and the development process. Moreover, by
 expanding educational opportunities in this
 country for Third World students, the United
 States would take advantage of the consider-
 able underutilized capacity that will result
 from the 25 per cent decline in American 18-
 year-olds by the end of the decade. One way to
 do this is to develop a much larger and more
 active foreign scholarship program. The
 United States used to make a major financial
 commitment in this area, and the benefits were
 enormous. Many of the current leaders in
 Indonesia, for example, were trained in the
 United States under government-sponsored
 programs. In the 1970s, however, such pro-
 grams stagnated.
 Currently, U.S.-sponsored training is based
 primarily on academic merit, focuses on grad-
 uate and postgraduate academic studies, and
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 runs for short periods (one month or so for the
 majority to two years at most). The two most
 important programs that bring students to the
 United States-AID's participating training
 program and academic exchanges sponsored
 by the International Communications Agency
 (ICA) -did not grow at all in the 1970s, despite
 the fact that the number of countries involved
 increased from 69 to 98. In fact, the number of
 people supported by AID's program dropped
 from 7,278 in 1976 to 6,065 in 1980. Students
 involved in ICA exchanges declined from 1,086
 in 1970 to 1,032 in 1979. The Carter budget for
 1982 would have allowed for a 20 per cent in-
 crease in ICA exchanges; this proposed increase
 was axed in the Reagan budget revisions.
 The U.S. approach contrasts sharply with
 that of the Soviet Union. The Soviets view
 academic and technical programs as an impor-
 tant, low-cost facet of their relations with
 developing countries. Students from Third
 World countries are included at undergraduate
 levels; the program is designed to meet the
 needs of those countries for skilled technicians
 and involves, generally, long periods of study
 (four to six years is normal). The Soviet pro-
 gram has been growing steadily. In 1970 about
 12,500 students from developing countries
 were trained in the Soviet Union. By 1978 this
 figure had more than doubled.
 Nowhere is the comparison between the two
 efforts more striking than in Central America
 and the Caribbean. U.S. programs provide
 about two-thirds as many places as are available
 in the USSR and Eastern Europe. When the
 large Cuban effort is added, the comparison
 becomes overwhelmingly disproportionate.
 U.S. programs also are of shorter duration and
 scattered in coverage; many countries receive
 little attention and some, none at all. U.S. ef-
 forts, moreover, exclude younger, less affluent
 students, a group which the Soviets and their
 allies carefully cultivate.
 Strengthening Multilateral Institutions
 The United States should reaffirm its sup-
 port for the key international financial institu-
 tions, including expansion of their lending
 programs. Among the U.N. development
 agencies, the United Nations Development
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 Programme and the United Nations Children's
 Fund also deserve particular support. U.S.
 support for all these institutions is important
 not only in and of itself, but also in mobilizing
 the resources of other countries, including the
 rich oil nations.
 In the last several years, the United States
 has supported measures to expand the financ-
 ing activities of the International Monetary
 Fund (IMF), including the establishment of a
 $10 billion supplementary financing facility
 (SFF). The United States also endorsed the con-
 cept of establishing a subsidy account to reduce
 interest payments on SFF borrowings by low-
 income countries. In addition, the United
 States has approved changes in IMF policies
 that greatly expand member countries' access
 to IMF resources and extend the period of ad-
 justment and repayment associated with IMF
 financing. These measures should encourage
 developing countries to undertake necessary
 adjustments before their economic problems
 reach crisis proportions. As a result, the likeli-
 hood of severe political and economic disrup-
 tions should be substantially lessened.
 The United States, however, has opposed
 giving special attention to development needs
 in the operations of the IMF. The U. S. position
 has been that the IMF is not a development
 institution. The position is correct in the sense
 that the IMF ought not to be providing medium-
 to long-term development financing. Never-
 theless, the United States should support a
 number of proposed reforms that would make
 the IMF more responsive to the economic prob-
 lems of developing countries. Three are of par-
 ticular importance.
 First, the United States should support an
 agreement to fund adequately a subsidy ac-
 count to help low-income countries reduce
 their interest payments not only on drawings
 from the existing SFF, but also on other funds
 derived from future IMF market borrowing.
 The funding could come from profits from the
 sale of remaining IMF gold or from direct gov-
 ernment contributions.
 Second, to insure adequate levels of funding
 under the IMF's revised conditionality guide-
 lines, the United States should endorse the
 fund's entry into new borrowing arrangements
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 or IMF borrowing from private capital markets.
 Third, Washington should support an ex-
 panded role for Special Drawing Rights (SDRs)
 and a change in the formula for distributing
 SDRs favorable to low-income countries. The
 IMF now distributes new SDRs on the basis of
 members' voting quotas. This allotment sys-
 tem generally provides the most new liquidity
 to those members that need it least. Although
 the total amount of new liquidity to be created
 should be based on the liquidity needs of the
 system as a whole, a new distribution formula,
 more favorable to developing countries, should
 be established.
 Of equal, if not greater, importance to devel-
 oping countries is the future of U.S. support
 for the multilateral development banks (MDBs),
 including the World Bank and the three re-
 gional development banks in Africa, Asia, and
 Latin America. The MDBs today are the largest
 source of official development capital and are
 major sources of development expertise. In
 1980 the four MDBs loaned $15 billion to devel-
 oping countries. Of this amount, $12.5 billion
 came from the World Bank.
 Initial statements by the Reagan administra-
 tion cast substantial doubt on continued strong
 U.S. support for the MDBs. These statements,
 echoed by some members of Congress, are
 based on judgments that MDB loans do not re-
 flect U.S. political and security interests in the
 Third World; that the MDBs support radical
 regimes that follow anti-Western economic
 policies; that loans from the MDBs promote
 development of large public sectors and public
 sector enterprises at the expense of private sec-
 tor development; and that MDB lending com-
 petes with, rather than acts as a catalyst for,
 private investment and private lending.
 These judgments are wrong on the particular
 points at issue. More important, they seriously
 underestimate both the value of U.S. participa-
 tion in the MDBs and the adverse consequences
 of a reduction in U.S. support.
 It is true that U.S. contributions to the mul-
 tilateral development banks are not responsive
 to short-term maneuvering for U.S. diplomatic
 advantage. They do not reward, for example, a
 country for voting with the United States on an
 issue before the U.N. Security Council. The
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 history of the past two decades demonstrates,
 however, that any attempt to use foreign aid to
 buy allies on issues of immediate concern will
 ultimately fail. Even if a country's friendship is
 for sale in the short run, it will be enormously
 expensive. The costs of shoring up even a
 single nation's economy can be staggering.
 Any attempt to use foreign aid to
 buy allies on issues of immediate
 concern will ultimately fail.
 U.S. contributions to the multilateral devel-
 opment banks do support American interests,
 although not always in immediate terms. Al-
 most all the biggest borrowers of MDB funds are
 key developing countries from a U.S. foreign
 policy perspective. Some are important as
 major markets for U.S. goods and services;
 others are strategically important. Most have
 expanding private sectors and, increasingly,
 open trade and investment policies. The major
 role of all the MDBs has been to finance the
 infrastructure development - roads, dams,
 ports, and electrification -that is essential to
 private enterprise.
 In addition, the MDBs have an important role
 in increasing the productivity of the many mil-
 lions of farmers in Third World countries and
 developing the human skills needed by a pro-
 ductive management and labor force. In mak-
 ing loans for economic development purposes,
 the MDBs follow policies and procedures de-
 signed to promote growing, open economies.
 The funds that the MDBs provide to these
 countries are obtained with a relatively small
 direct U.S. budget expenditure. The World
 Bank has total outstanding loan commitments
 of $51.5 billion. Of that amount, the United
 States provided only $703 million. The rest
 came from other donors and from direct bor-
 rowings in the world capital markets. Although
 the leverage of other MDBs is not as dramatic, it
 is substantial.
 A reduction in U.S. support for the MDBs
 would have serious effects not only on develop-
 ing countries but also on American exports,
 American banks, and U.S. relations with the
 Western allies. Developing countries face in-
 creasing oil import bills, sluggishness in their
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 traditional export markets, and high levels of
 indebtedness made worse by high interest
 rates. Without MDB assistance, their ability to
 import U.S. goods will suffer further. U.S.
 banks have more than $60 billion outstanding
 in loans to the Third World. All of the Western
 allies also have important economic ties with
 developing countries. They are more de-
 pendent than the United States on exports to
 Third World countries and on oil and other
 raw materials imported from those countries.
 In 1979 and 1980, the United States sup-
 ported a new World Bank structural adjust-
 ment lending program and, with other devel-
 oped countries, asked the World Bank to
 consider ways of expanding and making more
 effective the funding of energy development in
 Third World countries. If the World Bank is to
 finance these new endeavors as well as meet the
 loan requests of one of its newest members,
 China, the bank will need additional funds well
 beyond those that can be raised by its 1980
 general capital increase. One possible solution
 worth serious consideration would be to raise
 the bank's borrowing-to-capitalization ratio
 from 1:1 to 2:1, as urged in the Brandt Com-
 mission report. The bank's borrowing, and
 thus lending, capacity could be doubled over
 time, without requiring increased legislative
 appropriations.
 The United States, however, is now in ar-
 rears in meeting its agreed contributions to the
 current replenishments and capital increases to
 the World Bank and to the three regional devel-
 opment banks. This failure to meet negotiated
 commitments has damaged the leadership posi-
 tion of the United States in world affairs and
 put a damper on the kind of international de-
 velopment cooperation called for by present
 world conditions. If the United States is to
 reassert its leadership in the development field,
 it must not only meet its resource commitments
 to the multilateral financing institutions, but it
 must also accept greater participation by de-
 veloping countries in international economic
 decision making.
 Many analysts now doubt the ability and
 willingness of the private commercial banks to
 handle fully the recycling of OPEC oil revenues.
 One alternative is for oil-exporting countries to
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 put more of their financial surpluses into the
 international financial institutions. Their will-
 ingness to do this depends, in large part, on
 their obtaining a corresponding increase in
 decision-making power in the institutions.
 A relatively new international organization,
 the International Fund for Agricultural Devel-
 opment (IFAD), suggests a possible approach.
 IFAD, inaugurated in 1977, is designed to pro-
 vide loans and grants for agricultural develop-
 ment in the poorest Third World countries.
 IFAD has three categories of members: de-
 veloped nations, OPEC countries, and non-oil-
 producing developing countries. Each of the
 three groups has an equal share of votes.
 The United States should make these efforts
 to strengthen the international financial institu-
 tions, but only if developing countries will
 share responsibility for the effective function-
 ing of these mainstays of international eco-
 nomic cooperation. Thus, oil exporting coun-
 tries with large capital surpluses should
 provide increased development financing; oil-
 importing developing countries should offer
 progress on issues of mutual concern, including
 energy, food production, and population con-
 trol; and the more advanced developing coun-
 tries should agree to a phased transition out of
 the ranks of aid recipient.
 Reversing a Downward Slide
 Finally, the United States should pledge to
 increase its concessional assistance for develop-
 ing countries in direct proportion to GNP
 growth. As the U.S. economy grows, U.S. aid
 would grow accordingly. The downward trend
 of aid levels in the 1970s would be broken. By
 promising that a share of American economic
 growth would be used to promote growth in
 developing countries, the United States would
 acknowledge increasing interdependence with
 developing countries. How might this work?
 Even under the most unfavorable estimates,
 the U.S. GNP is projected to grow by at least 2
 per cent annually over the next four years.
 Developing countries should receive through
 U.S. foreign economic assistance the same
 2 per cent share of GNP increases averaged over
 the preceding three years. The 1983 increase
 would, therefore, be 2 per cent of the average
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 of GNP increases in 1980, 1981, and 1982.
 Using this formula and conservative estimates
 of 2 per cent annual GNP growth between 1982
 and 1985, the foreign assistance budget would
 rise from about $8.6 billion in 1982 to $14.4
 billion in 1985 at current prices. This change
 would represent an increase from 0.28 per cent
 of U.S. GNP in 1982 to 0.35 per cent in 1985.
 If, however, GNP growth averages 3.5 per cent
 a year, then the 1985 foreign assistance budget
 would rise to $16.7 billion in current prices.
 The United States coulcfuse at least some of
 the additional money to assist key low-income
 countries in the identification and design of
 projects to be financed by the private sector or
 by the MDBs. The United States would be able
 not only to concentrate additional resources on
 the poorest countries of special importance to
 it, but also use its bilateral assistance to help
 those countries obtain the far greater resources
 of the MDBs and private investors. In any
 event, the U.S. bilateral aid program should
 continue the pattern adopted in 1979 of increas-
 ing concentration on the developing countries
 where the need is most severe, the potential for
 effective development is greatest, and develop-
 ment is most directly in U.S. interests.
 This proposed program for economic coop-
 eration constitutes a basic core of actions that
 the United States should undertake in Third
 World countries to promote U.S. interests and
 leadership. It would associate the United
 States with processes of economic development
 that enjoy the support of Third World people
 and, in turn, enhance their interests in strong,
 stable, and mutually beneficial relations with
 the United States. Few of the recommenda-
 tions would involve large increases in govern-
 ment expenditures. All would undoubtedly
 run up against some domestic opposition; but
 all parts of the program would also have domes-
 tic constituents. Opinion polls indicate broad
 public support for an assertion of constructive
 U.S. leadership in the world, and Reagan has
 said he accepts the challenge. The program
 outlined here is essential to that task.
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